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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the effects of a mandated credit program to small and medium enterprises in the 
Philippines (Magna Carta Law) using a panel dataset compiled from official data published by the 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The final sample of 109 financial institutions represented over 90% 
of total finance sector assets in the Philippines. We highlight three important findings.  First, 
although the total lending levels to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) grew slightly, 
the percentage shares of loans allocated to MSMEs declined drastically from a peak of 30% of 
total loans in 2002 to 16.4% in 2010. Second, following the upwards revision of the loan target 
(from 6% to 8%) for smaller firms in 2008, there was a sharp increase in noncompliance especially 
amongst universal and commercial banks. On the other hand, total loans to medium enterprises 
were still more than threefold larger than the targeted 2%. Third, there is an increased 
heterogeneity in optimal loan portfolio across banks. Most surprisingly, the absolute level of 
MSME lending by rural and cooperative banks declined since 2008. Direct compliance amongst 
universal and commercial banks decreased beginning in the late 2007, while that of thrift banks 
increased to almost 100%. Abolishing the Magna Carta targets for medium-sized enterprise loans 
would most likely yield little adverse effects. Meanwhile, efforts to improve financial access to 
MSMEs should focus on alternative nondistortionary ways to increase financing supply, such as 
improving institutional framework for informational availability and development of equity and 
bond markets for MSMEs. 
 
 
 
Keywords: financial inclusion, financial markets, financial policy, Philippines, SME, targeted 
lending 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is the lifeblood of most economies. A vibrant 
MSME sector is especially essential in spreading the economy’s wealth in developing economies, 
by creating more opportunities in rural areas, maintaining social stability, and fostering inclusive 
economic growth. Central to MSME development is access to finance. Availability and cost of 
funds determine firms’ ability to compete for market share, innovate, expand and withstand 
business-related stresses. However, since financial markets in most developing economies are 
largely underdeveloped with far from ideal regulatory frameworks, many governments in 
developing Asia have designed medium and long-term MSME development plans, with the main 
goal of improving financing for MSMEs. 
 
In the Philippines, one of the most important inclusive financing policies is the mandated 
credit program known as the MSME Magna Carta (Magna Carta). MSMEs account for 99.6% of 
total firms and 61% of total employment in the Philippines. A recent study of the Philippines found 
that access to formal sector financing is indeed one of the key constraints that strongly affect firms’ 
dynamism (see Khor, Sebastian, and Aldaba 2013). At the same time, MSMEs do not have easy 
access to the equities nor bonds market.   
 
The main objective of the Magna Carta legislation was to promote, support, strengthen 
and encourage the growth and development of MSMEs in all productive sectors of the economy 
particularly rural and agriculture-based enterprises.1 The Magna Carta was first enacted and 
implemented in 1991 (courtesy of Republic Act 6977)—a time when the authorities were grappling 
for ways to resurrect an ailing economy following a decade of tumultuous business climate. In the 
subsequent twenty years, the law was amended twice to take into account the changes in the 
business and economic conditions. 
 
The Magna Carta mandated Filipino banks to allot 10% of their loan portfolio to MSMEs. 
Although not explicitly mentioned, there are three reasons why the regulation specifically targeted 
banks. Firstly, banks hold the biggest stock of financial resources in the Philippines, accounting 
for approximately 80% of domestic financial resources. Secondly, banks have the most extensive 
branches among credit intermediaries. Lastly, banks are administratively easier to monitor since 
they regularly report their activities to the Philippines central bank.2 
 
Mandated credit program such as the Magna Carta is not unique to the Philippines. 
Lending targets set for priority sectors, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs), are 
imposed in developing economies such as Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The 
Magna Carta is also not the first mandated credit provision imposed on Filipino banks. In 1974, 
the Philippines central bank had directed banks to allot a portion of their loan portfolio to the 
agriculture sector. This central bank issuance eventually became known as the Agri-Agra Law 
and continues to be an active regulation to date.  
 
How has the Magna Carta impacted banks’ lending towards MSMEs? Surprisingly, 
literature assessing the implementation of the law and its economic impact is very limited. Medalla 
and Ravallo (1997) assessed the way banks responded to the Agri-Agra Law and the Magna 
                                                 
1  Republic Act No. 9501. Magna Carta for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). http://www.lawphil.net/ 
statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9501_2008.html  
2  While there were questions raised on the rationale of the policy, Medalla and Ravallo (1997) argued that this kind of 
measure can be justified from a social standpoint since otherwise, banks are driven to channel funds to projects that 
generate high private returns but not necessarily social returns. 
 Carta. The authors found out that between 1975 and 1996, compliance with Agri-Agra Law had 
continuously declined. Furthermore, compounded annual growth of Agri-Agra Law loans during 
the period is roughly 3 percentage points lower than the annual growth of total loan portfolio of 
Filipino banks during the same period.3 The authors also noted that from 1991 to 1996, aggregate 
compliance ratios to the Magna Carta by bank type remained above what the law requires by a 
good margin. They just highlighted that foreign banks tend not to comply with the law on a 
consistent basis and are drawn toward alternative compliance mechanisms rather investing 
directly in firms in spite of the general trend in the industry that is skewed heavily on direct lending. 
 
Furthermore, little is known on the compliance with Magna Carta beyond 1996. This paper 
is thus undertaken to investigate the patterns of bank lending to MSME in the Philippines after 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and in conjunction to that, the compliance of banks to the Magna 
Carta lending provisions post 1996. We will also attempt to shed light on the characteristics of 
banks base on their lending exposure to the MSMEs in terms of bank type. To our knowledge, 
this is the first publicly available study on MSME lending in the Philippines from banks’ perspective. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the domestic financial 
market conditions, the customary sources of credit of MSMEs in the Philippines and the 
government initiatives to boost MSME financing particularly the Magna Carta. Section 3 will layout 
the salient features of the lending provisions of the Magna Carta. Section 4 will assess the trends 
of bank lending to MSMEs as well as their compliance to the lending provisions of the Magna 
Carta using the datasets compiled by the central bank of the Philippines, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (BSP) up to end of 2012. Section 5 will explain recent developments that could potentially 
influence banks’ lending behavior concerning MSMEs in the near term and discuss areas for 
further research. 
 
 
2. FINANCING MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
2.1 Definitions 
 
MSMEs in the Philippines are legally defined in two ways. The first definition is based on 
employment levels according to the National Statistics Office, while the second definition is based 
on asset values specified by the BSP (Table 1). According to employment-based classification, 
large firms are defined as those employing more than 200 workers, while micro-firms employ less 
than 10 workers, small firm 10 to 99 workers, and medium 100 to 199 workers. According to BSP, 
micro firms are those whose assets do not exceed PHP 3 million (approximately USD 70,000), 
while the asset limits for small and medium firms are respectively PHP 15 million and PHP 100 
million (approximately USD 349,000 and USD 2.5million). Those whose assets exceed PHP 100 
million are categorized as large firms. This sometimes presents a challenge when we examine 
data on MSMEs financing, since there exists no harmonized supply and demand-side dataset. 
Credit demand-side data on firms are usually based on employment clusters since these datasets 
are mostly compiled by the National Statistics Office. On the other hand, supply-side credit data 
such as total loans are typically based on asset clusters defined by the BSP since reporting banks 
have to follow the BSP’s framework. 
 
                                                 
3 Medalla and Ravallo (1997) also argued that until 1988, banks have taken advantage of alternative compliance in the 
form of special series treasury bills that masked the degree of decline in lending. When alternative compliance is 
accounted for, the drop in lending became very apparent. 
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MSMEs comprise almost all of the total 820,255 firms in the Philippines. According to the 
2011 survey data from the National Statistics Office, 90.6% were microenterprises, 8.6% small, 
0.4% medium and 0.4% large (Table 2). Altogether MSMEs employ roughly 61% of the total 
employees in the economy. This distribution profile hardly changed in the last two decades. In 
spite of their enormous number, however, MSMEs only contributed 35.7% to gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2011. The largest concentrations of MSMEs are found in wholesale, retail, and 
trade segment. Over 50% of them are located in the National Capital Region, Central Luzon 
(Region 3), and Calabarzon (Region 4A)—the top three regions which, as of 2012, contribute over 
60% to the national GDP. 4  
 
2.2 Sources of Credit 
 
Firms’ need for additional capital is typically addressed by (i) banks; (ii) bonds market; (iii) equities 
market; (iv) nonbank lending institutions like quasi banks and investment houses, pawnshops, 
financing cooperatives, savings and loans associations, insurance companies, venture capitalists, 
and specialized government lending corporations; and (v) informal sector players, such as family 
members, friends, and unaccredited retail lenders. 
 
Just like in many developing economies, MSMEs in the Philippines have limited access to 
the equities market. MSMEs accounted for a mere 0.005% of total market capitalization by end 
of 2012, and are also not considered reputable enough to enter the bonds market.5 Other large 
scale credit sources like quasi banks, investment houses, and insurance companies typically also 
shy away from MSME clients while the role of venture capital firms remain quite small. Thus, given 
that access to formal financing is relatively scarce for MSMEs, capital options usually narrow to 
informal sectors, such as financing cooperatives, savings and loans associations, pawnshops, 
and informal sector lenders. 
 
Assessments of credit provisions suggest that MSMEs rely on their internally generated 
resources to bankroll up to 78% of their operations (Table 3). In contrast, formal financial 
institutions only contribute somewhere between 11% and 21% of the MSMEs’ funding. The lack 
of reliable financial information from MSMEs leads to the perception of higher risk. In addition, 
lower expected profitability, the absence of acceptable collateral by MSMEs, the lack of a national 
credit rating system for MSMEs contribute to the low loan releases from banks to the sector. 
 
 
2.3 The Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Magna Carta 
 
In an effort to aid MSMEs with their credit needs, the Philippine authorities enacted the Magna 
Carta in 1991, mandating banks to allocate 10% of their lending portfolio to MSMEs. The MSME 
Magna Carta also laid out a number of important supporting measures. These measures include 
classification of enterprises by asset size (micro, cottage, small, and medium) and laying out a 
coordinated structural support and safeguards system to enhance the growth of each category of 
enterprises. 
The Magna Carta led to the creation of several government agencies across several 
ministries. The Small and Medium Enterprise Development Council6 was created as an attached 
agency of the Department of Trade and Industry to carry out the objectives of the law and 
                                                 
4  There are 16 regions in the Philippines. 
5  By the end of December 2012, the declared market capitalization of SMEs in the Philippine stock exchange is 
P586.4 million ($14.2 million) whereas the total market capitalization is P10.9 trillion ($265.3 billion). 
6  This agency was later renamed as the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Development Council (MSMEDC). 
 appointed the Bureau of Small and Medium Enterprises Development (BSMBD)7 as the council 
secretariat. The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation was set up to improve 
production operations and business network of firms, provide financial services to small and 
medium enterprises (except those involved in trading and crop-level production) and develop 
alternative modes of financing and guarantee loans secured by qualified SMEs. The Small 
Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation and the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprises8 were merged in November 2001 to form the Small Business Corporation (SBC) to 
consolidate their resources.9 Today, the SBC and the much older Philippine Export-Import Credit 
Agency are presently the two main agencies charged to expand financial access for MSMEs.10  
 
 These agencies unified and simplified business procedures and requirements, making 
government services readily available to businesses outside the centers of commerce and 
“incentivizing” financing to the MSMEs. The latter include both monetary and nonmonetary 
incentives, as well as directing public government banks (which at that time including the 
Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Land Bank of the 
Philippines) to provide financing assistance to MSME entrepreneurs. 
 
The Magna Carta was amended twice in 1997 and 2002 (RA 6977 amended by RA 8289 
and RA 9501) to adjust the legislation to firms’ needs and changing economic conditions. Most 
importantly, the thresholds for asset-based enterprise classification were significantly adjusted in 
these two revisions. The thresholds for micro and medium firms changed the most, approximately 
tripling between 1991 and 1997, and roughly doubling between 1997 and 2002 (Table 4). These 
variations would prove to be very important to banks in their compliance to the mandated lending 
provision of the law. The increased thresholds mean that their target market for MSMEs had also 
increased in size.  
 
In addition, the coverage of the law and the mandated share of MSMEs bank lending have 
also changed over the years (Table 5). In 1991, the initial mandated share of bank lending to 
small firms was 5% of total bank lending. This was doubled in 1992 to 10%, and then reduced to 
5% again in 1996. The 1997 revision recognized that medium firms are fundamentally different 
from smaller firms, and established of two separate compliance rates for medium and smaller 
firms: for the next ten years, Philippines banks were mandated to set 6% of their total loan portfolio 
to small firms and another 2% to medium firms. In the 2008 revision, the law was extended to 
cover microenterprises, and mandated all banks to allocate 2% of their total loan portfolio to 
medium firms, and a further 8% to micro and small firms. 
 
Firms considered eligible to be covered by the law have to satisfy the following four 
conditions. First, firms need to be registered with the appropriate agencies as presently provided 
by law. Second, firms should be fully (100%) owned, capitalized by Filipino citizens, whether 
single proprietorship or partnership. If the enterprise is a juridical entity, at least 60% of its capital 
or outstanding stocks must be owned by Filipino citizens. Third, firms should be participating in a 
                                                 
7  This bureau was later renamed as Bureau of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (BMSMED). 
8  The Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises was established earlier in 1984 operated by the Livelihood 
Corporation attached to the office of the president tasked to provide guarantee services to participating financial 
institutions (PFIs) that had been lending to SMEs. (ADB 2010) 
9  The agency which was put under the supervision of the central bank has a board comprised of representatives both 
from the private sector and the public sector, namely the National Government, Land Bank of the Philippines, 
Development Bank of the Philippines, Department of Trade and Industry, and Department of Finance (DOF). 
10  The Philippine Export-Import Credit Agency (PhilEXIM) was established in 1977 under the DOF to pursue the policy 
of the State “to encourage and promote the expansion of Philippine exports and to establish a strong and credible 
export credit institution, which shall be dedicated to the provision of export financing facilities and services to support 
the country’s sector (See PhilEXIM’s website). See also ADB (2005). 
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business activity within the major sectors of the economy, namely, industry, trade, services, 
including the practice of one’s profession, the operation of tourism-related establishments, and 
agribusiness. Lastly, eligible firms are those that are not a branch, subsidiary or division of larger 
scale enterprises. 
 
2.4 Other Initiatives to Encourage Lending to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises 
 
To keep bank funds flowing steadily to the MSME sector, the BSP also instituted a number of 
measures to compensate lending institutions for the burden brought about by the Magna Carta. 
These include:  
 
(i) Allowing the establishment of microfinance-oriented thrift banks and rural banks as 
an exemption from branching moratorium; 
(ii) Exemption of microfinance loans from normal documentation applicable to regular 
bank loans;  
(iii) Reduction of the reserve requirements on thrift banks and rural banks which deal 
with SMEs and small borrowers; 
(iv) Reduction of the risk weight applicable to qualified SMEs and microfinance loan 
portfolios from 100% to 75% subject to certain conditions, such as performance and 
financial soundness of the bank and adequacy of risk management system; 
(v) Exemption of SME loans without latest income tax returns and/or audited financial 
statements from “Loans Especially Mentioned” classification provided said loans are 
current, have not been restructured, and are supported by income tax return and/or 
audited financial statement at the time they were granted; 
(vi) Deferment, for a period of 1 year, of the implementation of the market-based pricing 
mechanism for rediscount loans below the 91-day Treasury bill rate to help jumpstart 
SME lending; and 
(vii) Approval of the 12-point accreditation guidelines for rural and thrift banks and the 
lending features of short- and long-term loans for direct or retail lending by 
participating government financial institutions under the SME Unified Lending 
Opportunities for National Growth (SULONG). 
 
The government also tried to increase the appeal of banking MSMEs, such as (i) 
establishing an effective loan guarantee system, (ii) finding ways to deal with collateral 
requirement issues, (iii) creating a public credit bureau, (iv) developing more appropriate ways to 
assess risk associated with lending to SMEs, and (v) optimizing the network of state-owned firms 
in delivering services to SMEs.  
 
In order to alleviate information gaps, one important solution considered by both regulators 
and financial institutions is the creation of a reliable credit scoring system to assess the credit 
viability of firms that can be used by the entire banking system. Notably, according to ADB report 
(2004), “SBC’s management has discovered (as have many other lenders in many places) that 
there is no clear correlation between the kind and quality of collateral offered to a lender and loan 
default. This implies that loan underwriting techniques that do not rely on traditional collateral are 
highly relevant in the Philippines.” 
 
To further strengthen its overall approach to facilitate financing for SMEs, the government 
implemented the SME Unified Lending Opportunities for National Growth (SULONG) program. 
The SULONG program, launched in 2003, essentially sought to provide SMEs alternative credit 
 sources through participating government financial institutions.11 The general objectives of the 
program were to: (i) simplify and standardize the lending procedures, (ii) reduce documentary 
requirements and expedite procedures, (iii) provide SMEs greater access to short- and long-term 
funds, and (iv) lower the effective cost of borrowing by SMEs and liberalize the requirement. 
 
More recently, the BSP rolled out the Credit Surety Fund program on 2 July 2008. The 
rationale of this fund is “to increase the credit worthiness of MSMEs that are experiencing difficulty 
in obtaining loans from banks due to lack of acceptable collaterals, credit knowledge and credit 
track records” (BSP 2013b). Essentially, the Credit Surety Fund can serve as: (i) an alternative to 
acceptable collaterals, (ii) security for loans of MSMEs that are members of a cooperative, and 
(iii) an assurance for payment of bank loans. Investors in the fund are comprised of cooperatives, 
nongovernment organizations, local government units, banks, donors, and the BSP. Eligible 
borrowers include MSMEs who are members of cooperatives and who have businesses that meet 
certain conditions (BSP 2013c). 
 
2.5 The Structure of the Banking Industry in the Philippines 
 
The banking industry in the Philippines forms the core of the financial system in the Philippines. 
Banks hold 80% of the approximately P10 trillion of total domestic financial assets as of end of 
2012.12 Nonbanks, which include investment houses and companies, among others, accounted 
for the remaining 20%. For the last 3 decades, this distribution hardly changed despite a fivefold 
growth in total financial assets from 1990 to 2000, and another 2.5-fold growth from 2000 to 2012 
(Table 6). 
 
Overall, banks in the Philippines are supervised by the BSP as prescribed by the General 
Banking Law passed in 2000. The law also classified banks in the Philippines as universal banks, 
commercial banks, thrift banks, rural and cooperative banks, or Islamic banks. The Monetary 
Board, which is the decision-making body of the central bank, may also create another type of 
bank if the need arises. The minimum capitalizations are highest for universal banks 
(P4.95 billion), followed by commercial banks (P2.4 billion), thrift banks (P1 billion for those 
headquartered in Manila and P250 million for others). The minimum capital requirement for rural 
banks and cooperatives are much lower, ranging from P100 million for those headquartered in 
Manila to below P5 million for those based in rural 5th–6th class municipalities. In our subsequent 
analysis, we group all these institutions into three broad groups: universal and commercial banks 
(UKBs), thrift banks (THBs or thrifts), and rural and cooperative banks (RCBs or rural co-ops). 
The average UKB has approximately 20 times the assets of the average thrift bank, which in turn 
has average total assets 20 times the average rural and cooperative banks. 
 
As of end of 2012, there were a total of 696 banks in the Philippines, of which 36 are UKBs, 
70 are THBs, 589 are RCBs, and 1 Islamic Bank (which is also classified by the BSP as a UKB). 
Although universal and commercial banks were the least numerous out of the three broad banking 
classifications, they have the most extensive branch networks and hold the biggest proportion of 
banking resources (e.g., asset, loans, deposits, and capital). All of the 37 UKBs accounted 
altogether for 89.4% of total banking assets, 86.3% of total loans, 88.6% of total deposits, as well 
as 54.7% of total bank offices around the country. Within this UKB group, there was also a huge 
dispersion in terms of resources: the biggest 10 UKBs housed 74.4% of the segment’s assets, 
release 74.3% of the segment’s loans, handle 71.9% of the segment’s deposits, and operate 
                                                 
11  These include the Development Bank of the Philippines, Land Bank of the Philippines, Small Business Guarantee 
Corporation, and the Social Security System. 
12  This is approximately equivalent of $250.4 billion, based on the exchange rate of P42 per US dollar. 
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83.7% of all the segment’s offices. In other words, two-thirds of the Philippines’ total financial 
assets and loans were concentrated in the top 10 universal and commercial banks in the country. 
 
Compared to the universal and commercial banks, the other banking institutions in the 
Philippines were comparatively much smaller. Rural and cooperative banks, which accounted for 
84.6% of all banking institutions (589 institutions out of 696 total in 2012), only accounted for 2.4% 
banking sector’s value, 3% of total lending, 2.2% of total deposits while running just 28.1% of all 
the banking counters nationwide. Thrift banks, which were represented by 70 institutions, hold 
only 8.3% of the sector’s total assets, disburse 10.7% of total loans, and manage 9.2% deposits 
through their 1,619 bank offices (17.2% of total) (Table 7).  
 
Each category of banks operated in generally distinct markets, though the market niches 
are starting to overlap. Rural and cooperative banks typically focused on retail clients and 
microloans in the countryside. The universal and commercial banks, on the other hand, serve as 
the primary arteries of credit for larger urban firms and are usually part of a bigger conglomerate 
groups themselves. Lastly, the thrift banks, some of which were large enough to compete with 
universal and commercial banks for big borrowers, normally focus on small and medium 
enterprises in metropolitan and provincial business centers left unaddressed by the UKBs. It is 
also important to note that a number of major thrift banks are likewise either affiliates of UKBs or 
financial arms of big holding companies. 
 
 
3. COMPLIANCE TO THE MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE MAGNA CARTA 
 
3.1 Direct Compliance 
 
The most important part of the MSME Magna Carta is the legal mandate for mandatory credit 
allocation that all lending institutions have to set aside 8% of their total loan portfolio for micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs), and a further 2% for medium enterprises (MEs). The BSP allows banks 
various channels to comply with the mandatory credit allocation for MSMEs. Basically, these can 
be divided into two categories namely, the direct compliance and the indirect compliance. As 
stipulated in BSP Circular 625 issued in 2008, ways to comply directly are enumerated below, 
and vary across the targeted firm size. 
 
For micro and small enterprises: 
 
(i) Actual extension of loans to eligible MSEs, other than to Barangay Microbusiness 
Enterprises (BMBEs) which are covered in Item “c(3)” hereof:13  Provided, however, 
that loans granted to MSEs other than BMBEs, to the extent funded by wholesale 
lending of, or rediscounted with, another bank shall not be eligible as compliance 
with the mandatory credit allocation; or 
(ii) Loans granted to export, import, and domestic micro and small scale traders, other 
than to BMBEs which are covered in Item “c(3)” hereof:  Provided, however, that 
loans granted to MSEs other than BMBEs, to the extent funded by wholesale lending 
of, or rediscounted with, another bank shall not be eligible as compliance with the 
mandatory credit allocation; or 
                                                 
13  Item c(3) under subsection X342.3 (Eligible credit exposures) of the BSP Manual of Regulations for Bank (MORB) 
2008  stipulates the mechanisms considered as “Alternative compliance for either or both MSEs or/and MEs." The 
provision classifies “Loans from whatever sources granted to BMBEs as provided under Subsection X365.5” as a 
form of alternative compliance. Section 365 of MORB 2008 covers regulations concerning “Loans to Barangay Micro 
Business Enterprises” while subsection X365.5 pertains to the “Incentives to participating financial institutions.” 
 (iii) Purchase of eligible MSE loans listed in Items “i” and “ii” of this list on a “without 
recourse” basis from other banks and financial institutions; or 
(iv) Purchase/discount on a “with or without recourse” basis of MSE receivables, other 
than BMBE receivables which are covered in Item “c(3)” hereof; or 
(v) Wholesale lending or rediscounting facility granted to participating financial 
institutions (PFIs) for on-lending to MSEs, other than to BMBEs which are covered 
in Item “c(3)” hereof; or 
(vi) Wholesale lending or rediscounting facility granted to PFIs for on-lending to export, 
import, and domestic micro and small scale traders, other than to BMBEs which are 
covered in Item “c(3)” hereof; or 
(vii) Commercial letters of credit outstanding, net of margin deposits, issued for the 
account of MSEs. 
 
 
For medium enterprises: 
 
(i) Actual extension of loans to eligible MEs  provided that loans granted to MEs to the 
extent funded by wholesale lending of, or rediscounted with, another bank shall not 
be eligible as compliance with the mandatory credit allocation; or 
(ii) Loans granted to export, import, and domestic medium scale traders provided that 
loans granted to MEs to the extent funded by wholesale lending of, or rediscounted 
with, another bank shall not be eligible as compliance with the mandatory credit 
allocation; or 
(iii) Purchase of eligible ME loans listed in items “i” and “ii” of this list on a “without 
recourse” basis from other banks and financial institutions; or 
(iv) Purchase/discount on a “with or without recourse” basis of ME receivables; or 
(v) Wholesale lending or rediscounting facility granted to PFIs for on-lending to MEs; or 
(vi) Wholesale lending or rediscounting facility granted to PFIs for on-lending to export, 
import, and domestic medium scale traders; or 
(vii) Commercial letters of credit outstanding, net of margin deposits, issued for the 
account of MEs. 
 
3.2 Alternative Compliance 
 
Acknowledging the difficulty and the risks of lending to fledgling enterprises early on, the 
government has established a set of alternative vehicles in order to comply with the MSME lending 
provisions of the Magna Carta. 
 
Alternative compliance for either or both MSEs or/and MEs are allowed on the following 
grounds: first through paid subscription or purchase of liability instruments offered by the SBC, 
through paid subscription of preferred shares of stock of the SBC, or through loans (irrespective 
of sources) granted to Barangay Microbusiness Enterprises.14 
 
Earlier, banks can also set aside special accounts consisting of cash or “due from BSP” 
for MSMEs  which are free, unencumbered, not hypothecated, not utilized or earmarked for other 
purposes and include the corresponding amounts to their compliance reports as per BSP Circular 
147 (1997). But this was no longer included as a mode of compliance under the new Magna Carta 
(RA 9501) beginning from 2008.  
 
                                                 
14  See BSP No. 625 dated 14 October 2008. Subsection X365.5 of circular explains fully the details of this item. 
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Another interesting feature of the law is the provision for aggregated group compliance. 
BSP Circular 625 (2008) states that “banks may be allowed to report compliance on a groupwide 
(i.e., consolidation of parent and subsidiary bank/s) basis so that excess compliance of any bank 
in the group can be used as compliance for any deficient bank in the group on the following 
conditions: (a) provided that the subsidiary bank/s is/are at least majority-owned by the parent 
bank and (b) provided further that the parent bank shall be held responsible for the compliance of 
the group.” 
 
 
3.3 Penalty for Noncompliance 
 
In case of non-compliance, the current penalty is relatively lenient compared with the previous 
versions of Magna Carta law.  Under initial versions of the law, non-compliant banks are fined by 
an amount no less than P500,000 and other officers of the erring lending institutions shall be 
individually liable for imprisonment of not less than 6 months. The subsequent revision of the law 
in 1997 extended the loan earmarking program for SMEs to 2007, and dropped imprisonment 
provision while maintaining the monetary fine (Table 5). 
 
The monetary penalty for noncompliance varied according to bank types though the 
amount was miniscule compared to the average banking assets of these institutions. Based on 
the most recent revision in 2008, banks were mandated to allocate 2% of their loan portfolio to 
medium enterprises, and 8% to micro and small enterprises. Yet banks were fined a mere $2,300 
for every percentage point that the banks failed to meet the stipulated medium enterprises loan 
share, and a mere $9,300 for every percentage point below the stipulated micro and small 
enterprises share of the banks’ loan portfolio. The penalty for other non-compliant reporting 
behaviors was even smaller—the daily fines for the delay in submitting compliant reports range 
from a mere $2 for rural and cooperative banks to $28 for universal and commercial banks (Table 
8). 
 
 
4. ASSESSING BANK COMPLIANCE TO THE MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM  
ENTERPRISE MAGNA CARTA 
 
Given the low levels of legal penalty stipulated for non-compliance with the MSME Magna Carta, 
we assessed actual bank compliance to the law. This section intends to shed light on the levels 
and trends of bank lending to MSMEs in the Philippines and to assess banks’ compliance to the 
Magna Carta. We proceed in two steps. First we provide an industry-level analysis, which 
examines the overall aggregate MSMEs lending activity of banks as a group. Second we use 
bank-level data to analyze patterns of compliance to the Magna Carta for MSMEs by individual 
universal and commercial banks, and thrift banks.  
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 
For the industry aggregate-level analysis, we used the data on banking industry’s lending to 
MSMEs provided by the BSP. The data series present information about the compliance to the 
Magna Carta for MSMEs of the three major bank types (UKBs, thrifts, and rural co-ops) covering 
the years from 1999 to 2010. Moreover, the data show the disaggregation of the MSME 
compliance to the Magna Carta according to type of compliance; in other words, we know whether 
the banks complied through direct compliance, indirect compliance, or “funds set aside for 
 MSMEs.”15 However, as mentioned earlier, funds set aside for MSMEs are no longer considered 
as mode of compliance beginning 2008.  
 
To assess compliance at the bank-level, we compiled a comprehensive panel dataset from 
the Published Statements of Condition of each lending institution posted on the BSP’s website. 
The data series covers periods from the first quarter of 2005 to the second quarter of 2011 but 
limited to UKBs and thrifts because the BSP does not post the compliance information for 
individual rural co-ops. While these published statements comprised the most complete data 
publicly available on the compliance patterns of financial institutions, we note two caveats 
pertaining to the quality of data. Firstly, the format of the compliance ratios in these published 
statements (i.e., whether in percentage or absolute terms) is not consistent across reports.  Thus, 
caution was exercised in building the panel dataset of compliance ratios. Secondly, a number of 
banks do not report their Magna Carta compliance ratios in some of their public statements. Hence, 
we distinguished zero lending to MSMEs from absence of data. Nevertheless, our post-cleaning 
final sample with complete data consists of 109 financial institutions (out of an initial sample of 
136), which altogether represented over 90% of the finance sector assets in the Philippines.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Aggregate Lending 
 
The outstanding amount lent by all lending institutions to MSMEs increased modestly from 1990 
to 2010 (Figure 1). Financing to MSMEs rose from P248.2 billion to P308.5 billion in those 12 
years, representing a growth rate of 2.3% per year. UKBs provide the bulk of these bank loans. 
Although their share decreased from 83.7% in 1999, they still accounted for 72.9% of the total 
loans in 2010. Thrifts, on the other hand, saw their share of MSME lending rising from 13% in 
1999 to 19.8% in 2010. The strongest growth in market share is observed for rural co-ops, which 
tripled their share of MSME financing from below 3.3% to12.6% in 2009, before retreating to just 
above 7.3% by the end of 2010.  
 
The decline in commercial banks’ market share is partially a result of tepid growth in their 
overall lending operations between 1999 and 2010, which saw a compounded annual growth rate 
of only 0.72%. Thrifts expanded their loans to MSMEs by over 7% annually during the 11-year 
span. Rural co-ops were even more aggressive in lending to MSMEs, growing their MSME 
portfolio by 20% annually until 2008 until a pullback beginning in 2009. In 2009, total MSME 
lending by rural co-ops declined by 1.4%, and then contracted sharply in 2010 by 41.9%.16  
 
The aggregate data reveals two important trends. Firstly, despite the increase in total 
lending volume, the share of MSMEs in the banking sector’s lending portfolio has declined 
significantly since 2002. Secondly, despite the decreasing share in MSME loans, aggregate 
lending to the MSME sector still far exceeds the explicit 10% goal of the Magna Carta. At the peak 
in 2002, MSMEs accounted for 30% of the total loan portfolio of all lending institutions. This 
declined to 16.4% in 2010 (Figure 2). The reduction in banks’ MSME exposure is common across 
banking groups. Thrifts have started moving away from the MSME market in 2000. The UKBs 
followed a similar track in 2002. And even the rural co-ops began expanding more in non-MSME 
market in 2006.  
                                                 
15  The “funds set aside for MSMEs” is defined by the BSP (as indicated in the data file) as the item consisting of either 
Cash on Hand and Due from BSP which are free, unencumbered, not hypothecated, not utilized or earmarked for 
other purposes. The Due from BSP is a special account deposited with the BSP and does not form part of the bank's 
legal reserves. Under the new mandatory credit allocation (RA 9501). 
16  The compounded annual growth rate of MSME lending for thrifts was 6%. In contrast, the compounded annual 
growth rate for rural co-ops was 19.3% from 1998 to 2008, and compounded annual growth from 1998 to 2010 fell 
to 9.8%. 
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It is important to point out that despite the decline, lending to medium firms in 2010 was 
more than 300% above the Magna Carta target of 2%, while that for micro and small firms were 
closer to the targeted 8% of total bank lending. Not so surprisingly, the reduction affected smaller 
firms more than medium firms (Figure 2). What is intriguing is that in 2010, the bank lending to 
medium firms, despite declining from a peak of 12.6% of all loans, was still more than threefold 
of the relevant Magna Carta target. Meanwhile, lending to the micro and small segment was closer 
to the mandatory requirement of 8%. This is mainly driven by the continuous decline of UKB 
lending to medium-sized enterprises—which in itself is already 1.4 percentage points below the 
legal requirement in 2010. Thrifts and rural co-ops, on the other hand, still keep their ratios above 
what is mandated by the Magna Carta but the pace at which these ratios are decreasing raises 
the question of the future trends for loans to micro and small firms. These trends imply that 
although absolute levels of lending to MSMEs are rising, the growth rates of lending to the said 
target sectors are consistently slower than the growth of bank lending to other sectors. 
 
 
4.3 Direct Compliance versus Alternative Compliance 
 
As we can see from Figure 3, banks favored direct compliance since 1999 and even more so 
since 2008. Data provided by the central bank indicate that banks have actually reduced exposure 
to other facilities and instead increased direct lending operations since 2008 to almost 100% of 
their lending to MSMEs. The lack of attractiveness of the yields of alternative notes appears to be 
one of the key issues.17 SBC’s wholesale lending also took a hit during the height of the global 
financial crisis when the central bank expanded and reduced the interest rate of its re-discounting 
facility to keep the banking system liquid, which directly competed with SBC's wholesale lending 
operations (ADB 2010). 
 
In response, the SBC, through Memorandum No. 6 (2011), has decided to narrow the 
spread of its notes against the benchmark secondary bond rate (PDST-F) from 33% of the yields 
of the corresponding reference fixed-income notes (1 year and 6 months) to 20%.18 SBC also 
issued preferred shares worth P1.6 billion at P100 per share (minimum of 2,000 shares) to further 
boost its capital. Notably, the ADB loan granted to SBC has been the corporation’s biggest 
infusion of rolling capital between 2000 and 2010. In 2005 the loan accounted for 11% of the 
corporation's total lending in 2006, 51% in 2007, 61% in 2008, and 76% in the first half of 2009 
(ADB 2010).  
 
4.4 Bank-Level Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section examines individual bank compliance to the Magna Carta for MSMEs, using 
comprehensive panel data that we have compiled. This is, as far as we are aware, the first panel 
data and analysis on this question. Data on these individual lending institutions were available 
quarterly from 2005 to 2011, and did not cover rural and cooperative banks. 
 
4.4.1 General trends of direct compliance  
 
                                                 
17 Lamberte (2002) observes that alternative modes of compliance like SBC notes “do not pay market rates” while 
deposits with the central bank allotted for SMEs do not bear interest. 
18  This secondary bond rate is also referred to as the Money Market Association of the Philippines (MART 1) benchmark 
rate.  
 Data from individual lending institutions reveals significant heterogeneity in the direct compliance 
of various lending institutions to the law. In particular, there was a decrease in direct compliance 
amongst universal and commercial banks beginning in the late 2007. Based on the data, 
approximately 33% of all the UKBs reporting data to the BSP were lending less than 8% of their 
total loan to micro and small enterprises by 2011. Another 10% of all UKBs also did not meet the 
2% of loan portfolio mandatory lending requirement to medium enterprises (Figure 4). 
 
This was a stark contrast to the earlier years, when direct compliance was much stronger. 
In 2005, non-compliant UKBs were only about 5% (small) and 5.3% (medium) of the group. 
Moreover, about a quarter of the supervised banks did not indicate their MSME lending ratios in 
their reports. Approximately three quarters of these banks with no data are foreign-owned. Based 
on the available information on loan portfolios of foreign-owned banks, it is possible that the actual 
noncompliance among UKBs could exceed 60% for micro and small, and around 25% for medium 
enterprises.19 
 
One of the reasons the sharp decrease in direct compliance could be the increase in the 
mandated MSME loan share from 6% to 8% following the revision of the law in 2008.  It is possible 
that many UKBs found it challenging to increase their loans to micro and small enterprises by another 
2 percentage points when the regulation was altered. Even though microenterprises were added into 
the equation, this proved to be of little value to them since microenterprises were not the focus of most 
UKBs. Unfortunately the data does not disaggregate loans to small and microenterprises. As for UKBs’ 
declining share of loans to medium firms, one potential explanation could be the uncertainties of the 
economic conditions that affected the country’s external position following the global financial crisis of 
2008. 
 
On the other hand, direct compliance among thrift banks has increased from 86% in 2005 
to almost 97% as of the first quarter of 2011 (Figure 5). Although it appears that the revision in 
the Magna Carta compounded by the sudden downturn in the general business climate has 
affected the UKBs lending to MSMEs adversely, these factors seem to have muted effect on thrift 
banks. Perhaps, the policy change may have even benefited them since thrift banks have better 
access to microenterprises than the universal banks. Hence, the inclusion of microenterprises in 
the mandated lending requirement has most likely allowed some of these thrift banks that are 
formerly below the benchmark to meet the legal requirement in spite of the 2 percentage point 
increase in the legal threshold. 
 
4.4.2 Robustness of direct compliance from 2005 to 2010  
 
Just as the aggregated data has highlighted, the average loan shares of both micro and small 
enterprises and medium enterprises were far higher than the legal targets of 6% and 2% 
respectively (Table 9). On average, the banks in this truncated sample increased the share of 
micro and small enterprises loans within their portfolio from an average of 15.8% in 2005 to 17.5% 
in 2010. Thus the average lending institution (out of 130) was lending 3 times the targeted share 
for small and medium enterprises. However, loans to medium firms were only slightly higher than 
targeted: in 2010, the average bank lent 10% of their portfolio to medium firms. 
 
Nonetheless, there is considerable dispersion in banks’ decisions to lend to MSMEs. 
Although UKBs supplied the biggest amount of loans to MSMEs, their own loan portfolio reflected 
that lending to MSMEs were not their priorities. For these banks, the share of micro and small 
                                                 
19  In a separate study, SBC also estimated that 60% of UKBs are not complying with the mandated MSE portfolio 
while 32% of UKBs are not complying with the mandated ME portfolio (See Lagua 2011). 
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firms in their loan portfolios ranged from 1.7% to 25.4% in 2010, while the share of medium firms 
ranged from 0.1% to 24.9%. It is noteworthy that the average UKB reported only 7.7% of loans to 
micro and small enterprises, which is below the Magna Carta target. 
 
Meanwhile, there is even greater dispersion in the portfolio decisions of the smaller thrift 
banks although on average they greatly exceeded the Magna Carta targets. The average thrift 
bank allotted 21.8% of its loans to micro and small firms (almost 3 times the target), and another 
11% to medium firms (over 5 times the target). This suggests that on average, the focus of thrift 
banks was indeed the smaller firms.20 Nevertheless, the share of loans to micro and small firms 
ranged from 1.1% to 88.2%, while that of medium firms ranged from 0.2% to 62.4%. Clearly, some 
thrift banks were focusing on micro and small firms, while some focused on larger firms. 
 
The trends from individual banks reporting data can be summarized in the following three points. 
First, universal and commercial banks tend to not focus on MSMEs though they supplied the bulk 
of credits to MSMEs. Second, loans to medium firms were much higher than legally mandated 
across all banks. Third, there was a huge dispersion across banks in their optimal loan portfolio 
choices.  
 
How many banks were directly complying with the Magna Carta Law? Our panel dataset 
on compliances included 24 quarters of data that can shed some light on the dispersion in portfolio 
choices (Table 10). We find that only 65.4% of all banks were complying directly on the target for 
micro and small enterprises at least one quarter. In other words, 36.4% of banks reported at least 
one incident of under-compliance. Only 2.1% of all banks reported under-complying with the 
target of direct lending to the micro and small enterprises for 13 to 16 quarters (more than half of 
all the periods observed). Another 5.5% of banks reported under-complying between 9 and 12 
quarters. More importantly, the majority of banks reported over-complying (and even super-
complying) with the micro and small lending targets for at least one quarter. In fact 8.4% of all 
banks reported that they super-complied for most of the periods observed. 
 
Not surprisingly, banks were better able to comply with the legal targets for medium 
enterprise loans. Most banks (69.2%) reported super-complying at least for one quarter by lending 
more than twice the legal mandate to medium firms. Only 15% of all banks reported any incidence 
of under-compliance. Furthermore, only 3.5% of all banks reported that they failed to comply with 
the medium-firm targets for more than 4 quarters during the period we observed. 
 
 
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
To summarize, our results highlighted three trends. First, although the total lending levels to 
MSMEs remained fairly stable, the percentage shares of loans allocated to MSMEs declined 
drastically from about 30% of total loans in 2002 to 16% of total loans in 2010. Second, banks are 
finding it harder to meet the target for loans to smaller firms, especially after the target was revised 
upwards in 2008. The new mandates resulted in a sharp increase in noncompliance in direct 
lending to micro and small firms, especially amongst universal and commercial banks. Kernel 
density estimates suggest that the revision of the Magna Carta in 2008 was binding for small firm 
lending particularly for the universal and commercial banks. Third, there is an increased 
dispersion in optimal loan portfolio across banks. Most surprisingly, the absolute level of MSME 
lending by rural co-ops declined since 2008. 
                                                 
 
  
Looking ahead, we see various developments recently could potentially further reduce 
banks’ lending to MSMEs. For one, the implementation of the new Basel 3 framework, which 
raises banks’ minimum financial ratios (e.g., Common Equity Tier 1 ratio, Tier 1 ratio and capital 
adequacy ratio), introduces new parameters such as liquidity coverage ratio and net stable 
funding ratio, and at the same time increases the risk weights of several asset items, could 
potentially siphon credit away from the MSME sector. These include the implementation of the 
Basel 3 parameters, the relaxation of foreign investor participation in rural co-ops, the 
establishment of the long-awaited credit information bureau, and the expansion of the Credit 
Surety Fund program of the BSP. There appears to a consensus that the new set of Basel 3 bank 
soundness criteria will have a dampening effect on MSME lending, not to mention that the BSP 
just announced a much higher set of ratios than what were prescribed by Basel 3. On the positive 
side, the latter three developments will most likely boost MSMEs’ bankability.   
 
Nonetheless, the BSP shows not only its willingness to adhere to the new set of standards 
but directed Philippine banks to maintain financial ratios that are 1.5 to 2 percentage points higher 
than the international benchmarks (BSP Circular No. 781 of 2013). It stipulated that inclusive of 
conservation buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, banks should maintain a Common Equity 
Tier 1 ratio of 8.5% (versus 7% in the B3F), a Tier 1 ratio of 10% (versus 8.5% in the B3F) and a 
capital adequacy ratio of 12% (versus 10% in the B3F).  In the same circular it was noted that the 
new set of guidelines will be effective beginning 1 January 2014.21  
 
Another potential drag on MSME financing is the continued decline in the number of rural 
co-ops (See box). A spate of bank closures has reduced the number of rural co-ops from 617 by 
end 2011 to 577 by the end of June 2013. This trend may not have a severe impact on the total 
value of loans by virtue of the small size of rural co-ops relative to the entire banking sector. But, 
adverse effect could be felt in terms of the number of MSME clients in the countryside that could 
lose access to formal credit and better served by rural co-ops prioritizing micro and small clients. 
 
On the upside, recognizing the challenges faced by rural banks, the government passed 
RA 10574 on 24 May 2013 that effectively increased the allowable equity share of foreigners in 
rural banks from 40% to 60%. The new law, which amended Sections 4 to 8 of the Rural Bank 
Act of 1992 (RA 7353), sought to assist rural banks in meeting the capital requirements and put 
them “on a level playing field with its thrift and commercial banking counterparts that are able to 
take in foreign partners” according to one of the bill’s authors in the Senate (Macrohon 2013). 
 
The prospect of having a fully functional credit information bureau by end of 2014 could 
also help a lot in improving the transparency of MSMEs’ financial standing. Named Credit 
Information Corporation (CiC), the government-owned and controlled credit bureau was 
established courtesy of the passage of the Credit Information System Act (RA 9510) on 31 
October 2008. The implementing rules and regulations of RA 9510 were ironed out on 27 May 
2009. However, it took more than 2 years before CiC started operating on 16 December 2011 
and another 5 months before its board members were appointed by the President.22 Recently, the 
                                                 
21  OECD (2012) argued that “the retail risk rating (75%) can be used to weight SME loans, provided the bank’s portfolio 
is diverse and the bank’s loan to an SME borrower is less than EUR1 million.” Nevertheless, it also noted that “the 
weighting system also favors many large enterprises over small ones: large companies with good external credit 
ratings (AAA) are assigned a 20% risk weight, whereas SMEs that are unrated have risk weightings of 100% or 
75%. Under Basel III, the difference in core Tier 1 capital the bank needs to hold against their loans is remarkable: 
7% of the loan for SMEs with 100% risk weighting, as opposed to 1.4% (7% × 20%) for a large company with an 
AAA rating.” 
22  See CiC Milestones: Historical Background and Timeline. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission, which is the government agency taking charge in setting 
up CiC, announced that it is expecting the new credit bureau to function fully in December 2014 
(Dumlao 2013).  
 
The CiC, which will mainly target small businesses, is a public–private partnership co-
owned by the government (60%) and the private sector (40%). As of November 2012, the private 
sector parties with stakes in the corporation include the Philippine Cooperatives Center, Bankers 
Association of the Philippines, Credit Card Association of the Philippines, Chamber of Thrift Banks, 
Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines, and the Philippine Credit Reporting Alliance (CiC 
2012). Note that, prior to the establishment of CiC, two credit bureaus have been created. These 
are the Credit Information Bureau Inc., which was an initiative of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines and the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines, and the Credit Bureau set up 
by the Bankers Association of the Philippines in 1991.23  However, the aforementioned two credit 
bureaus have largely confined their operations to large companies. 
 
The expansion of the BSP’s Credit Surety Fund program is an additional booster to MSME 
lending. From just one fund, the number of pooled resource financing vehicle rose to 27 by the 
end of March 2013. Since 2010, the approved loans increased fivefold from P134 million to P679.2 
million by the end of the first quarter of 2013. In the same period, released loans increased over 
sixfold from a little less than P82.2 million to P501.6 million.24 
 
Despite the Magna Carta and its subsequent revisions along with the accompanying 
support measures, bank lending to MSMEs has not increased much. More disconcertingly, MSME 
lending is generally on a decline as a ratio of banks’ total loan portfolio. A substantial drop in 
MSMEs’ share in bank loans is particularly evident among UKBs. Even thrifts and rural co-ops, 
which are supposed to be the ones absorbing the MSME credit demand, have likewise reduced 
their lending ratios to the MSMEs quite significantly from 2004 to 2010. Although nominal values 
show that lending by thrifts and rural co-ops to MSMEs are growing at a decent pace, it appears 
that their lending to other sectors are expanding even more briskly.  
 
Smaller firms are impacted more than medium-sized firms with the ongoing migration of 
bank lending portfolio to non-MSME clients. UKBs as a group have already decreased their 
MSME lending below the mandated 8% ratio. At the level of individual institutions, there is also a 
notable increase in the number of UKBs not complying with the MSE lending provision of the 
Magna Carta. In other words, it is more profitable for UKBs to pay the penalties rather than lend 
to MSEs.  
 
On the other hand, MSE lending of thrifts and RCBs continues to expand. But, lending 
data illustrate that the share of MSEs in their credit disbursements has declined significantly 
although still well above the Magna Carta’s required ratio. Further research would be required to 
understand the determinants of this pattern. Nonetheless, understanding these recent changes 
in MSME lending preferences would be essential in crafting future financial inclusion programs. 
On a positive note, bank-level data suggest that more thrifts have recently become more 
compliant to MSE lending requirement.  
 
We conjecture that perhaps abolishing the Magna Carta targets for loans to medium-sized 
enterprises might not have much adverse effects. It is also notable that consistently, banks do not 
have trouble complying with the mandated lending ratio for middle-sized firms. As of 2010, UKBs, 
                                                 
23  The Central Bank of the Philippines was renamed Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in 1993. 
24  See BSP (2013b). 
 thrifts and rural co-ops maintained a good positive margin with respect to the legal requirement 
and noncompliance was limited. However, the steady downward trend in MSME loan allocation 
across bank groups in recent years cannot be overlooked. This trend parallels the downward drift 
of banks’ lending ratio to micro and small firms explained above. The differences lie in the degree 
of the decline —which is more muted in the case of lending to medium firms whereby the banks’ 
allocation was still much higher than mandated by law. 
 
The overall pattern of decreasing share of bank lending to MSMEs thus suggests a need 
to revisit, if not redesign, the current MSME lending policy framework. While the dynamism of the 
MSME sector hinges upon having reliable access to financing, banks in return should be given 
reasonable incentives to align their business models with the government’s social agenda. In 
addition, there are ways to increase alternative sources of credit for MSMEs, such as developing 
equities and bonds market suitable for MSMEs. The government could also further improve 
measures to increase financing supply by harnessing untapped domestic savings and foreign 
exchange reserves rather than relying on a strict mandate on banks’ portfolio allocation. Banks 
were finding it increasingly onerous to comply with the law and more than a half of commercial 
and universal banks undercomplied for at least a quarter during the period we observed. 
Expanding alternative means of financial access for MSMEs would be even more important given 
looming policy and institutional changes. 
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Table 1: Definitions of MSMEs in the Philippines 
 
Firm Type 
NSO, Employment Level Range 
(number of employees) BSP, Asset Size Range (P) 
Micro 1–9 <3,000,000 
Small 10–99 3,000,001–15,000,000 
Medium 100–199 15,000,001–100,000,000 
Large >200 >100,000,00 
BSP = Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, MSME = micro, small, and medium enterprise, NSO = National Statistics 
Office.              
Sources: SMED Council Resolution No. 1 (2003); Republic Act 9501 (2008). 
 
 
Table 2: Profile of Firms in the Philippines, 2011 
 
 Micro Small Medium Large MSME 
Number of firms 743,250 70,222 3,287 3,496 816,759 
Share (%) 90.6 8.6 0.4 0.4 99.6  
      
Employment (million) 1.78  1.64  0.45  2.47  3.87  
Share (%) 28.0 25.9 7.1 39.0 61.0  
      
Firm distribution by industry (%)      
  Wholesale, retail, and trade 48.7  29.8  16.9  11.3  47.0  
  Manufacturing 13.6  14.3  27.4  29.3  13.7  
  Accommodation and food service 12.6  16.0  5.8  2.4  12.9  
  Others 25.1  39.9  49.9  57.0  26.5  
      
Regional location, firm distribution (%)     
  National Capital Region 24.2 43.2 45.0 46.3 26.0 
  Region 3 10.3 8.8 8.1 5.6 10.2 
  Region 4A 15.4 11.1 14.1 17.5 15.0 
  Others (13 regions) 50.0 36.9 32.9 30.5 48.8 
MSME = micro, small, and medium 
enterprise. 
Source: National Statistics Office. 
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Table 3: SMEs' Sources of Funding  
(% of current funding) 
 
  SERDEF-UP 
ISSI, 1992 
WBES, 
2000 
ICPS-ADB, 
2004 
PEP-IFC, 
2006 
WBES, 
2009a 
Own resources 78 52 60 69 76.4 
Bank loans 15 21 11 19 10.2 
Nonbank financial institution         0.9 
Informal creditb 7 27 29 12 12.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
ICPS-ADB = Investment Climate and Productivity Study, Asian Development Bank, PEP-IFC = Private Enterprise Partnership for 
the Philippines (PEP-Philippines) SME Financing Survey, International Finance Corporation, SERDEF-UP ISSI = Small Enterprise 
Research and Development Foundation-University of the Philippines  Institute for Small Scale Industries; SME = small and medium 
enterprise, WBES = World Bank Enterprise Survey. 
a  Shares in the firms' working capital. 
b  Purchases on credit from suppliers/advances from customers + loans from moneylenders, friends, and relatives. 
Sources: Nangia and Villancourt 2007; WBES 2009. 
 
 
Table 4: Evolution of Asset-Based Definition of MSMEs  
 
Law/ 
Regulation 
Year 
Enacted 
Micro 
 
Cottage 
 
Small 
(P) 
Medium 
 
Large 
 
RA 6977 1991 <50,000 50,001–
500,000 
500,001–
5,000,000 
5,000,001–
20,000,000 
>20,000,000
RA 8289 1997 <1,500,001  1,500,001–
15,000,000 
15,000,001–
60,000,000 
>60,000,000
SMED 
Councila  
 and RA 9501 
2003 
2008 
<3,000,000  3,000,001–
15,000,000 
15,000,001–
100,000,000 
>100,000,00
MSME = micro, small, and medium enterprise; RA = Republic Act; SMED = Small and Medium Enterprise Development. 
a  Refers to SMED Council Resolution No. 1 (2003).
 
 
 
Table 5: Mandatory Share of MSME in Banks’ Loan Portfolio 
 
Law 
Year 
Enacted Coverage (enterprises) 
Share in Banks’ Loan Portfolio  
(years in effect) 
RA 6977      1991 Small 5% (1991); 10% (1992–1995); 5% 
(1996); 0% (1997) 
RA 8289      1997 Small and medium Small: 6% (1997–2007)a 
Medium: 2% (1997–2007) 
RA 9501;  
BSP Circular 625 
(2008) 
     2008 Micro, small, and medium Micro and Small: 8% (2008–2018) 
Medium: 2% (2008–2018)a 
BSP = Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; RA = Republic Act. 
a  RA 8289 should have ended in May 2007 but implementation of the lending provision was extended until early December 
2008 (BSP Circular Letter 2007-039) because the BSP issued circular 625-2008 pursuant to RA 9501 only on 14 October 
2008, which became effective 15 days after it was published on 20 October 2008.  
 
  
22   |   References 
1 
 
Table 6: Total Resources of the Philippine Financial System  
(PHP, billion) 
 
Year Total UKBa THBb RCB Total Banks Nonbanksc 
1970 18.8 17.2 0.9 0.7 18.8  
1980 248.1 172.6 10.6 5.6 188.8 59.3 
1990 800.2 558.2 37.6 13.9 609.7 190.5 
2000 4,077.9 3,013.6 245.8 67.4 3,326.7 751.1 
2010 9,046.3 6,423.7 626.4 180.1 7,230.2 1,816.1 
2012 10,516.2 7,486.7 681.6 190.1 8,358.3 2,157.8 
RCB = rural and cooperative bank, THB = thrift bank, UKB = universal and commercial bank.  
a Includes specialized government banks. 
b  Includes savings and mortgage banks, private development banks, and stock savings and loan associations. 
c  Includes investment houses, finance companies, investment  companies, securities dealers/brokers, pawnshops, lending 
investors, nonstock savings and loan associations., venture capital corporations, credit card companies, which are under BSP 
supervision, and private and government insurance companies (e.g., Social Security System and Government Service 
Insurance System). 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
 
Table 7: Financial Indicators and Bank Network (units) by Bank Type, Philippines, 2012 
 
Level (PHP billion) Assets Loans Deposits Capital Head Office Branches 
Total 
Offices
UKBa 7,193.8 3,617.2 5,097.5 937.1 37 5,108 5,145 
of which: Top 10 5,350.2 2,686.6 3,931.1 673.6 10 4,297 4,307 
THB 666.2 446.6 529.8 81.1 70 1,549 1,619 
RCB 189.7 127.5 126.4 33.3 589 2,057 2,646 
Total 8,049.7 4,191.3 5,753.6 1,051.5 696 8,714 9,410 
Distribution (%)         
UKB 89.4 86.3 88.6 89.1 5.3 58.6 54.7
of which: Top 10        
% of UKB 74.4 74.3 77.1 71.9 27.0 84.1 83.7
% of Total 66.5 64.1 68.3 64.1 1.4 49.3 45.8
THB 8.3 10.7 9.2 7.7 10.1 17.8 17.2
RCB 2.4 3.0 2.2 3.2 84.6 23.6 28.1
RCB = rural and cooperative bank, THB = thrift bank, UKB = universal and commercial bank. 
a  Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines is subsumed under UKB (per BSP directory of Banks). 
Sources: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; Annual Reports and Press Releases of the top 10 banks (by asset size) for the number of 
branches. 
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Table 8: Penalty Matrix 
Item PHP $ equivalent
Zero compliance 500,000 11,628 
Undercompliance, end of each quarter:   
   Micro and small enterprises % of undercompliance* (P400,000)      * (9,302) 
   Medium enterprises % of undercompliance* (P100,000)      * (2,326) 
Willful false statements to the BSP P500,000 per quarter-end  
Nonsubmission/delayed submission of reports on 
compliance  (per calendar day of delay)   
   Universal and commercial banks (UKBs) 1,200 27.9 
   Thrift banks (THBs)   600 14.0 
   Rural and cooperative banks (RCBs)     80   1.9 
Source: Republic Act 9501. 
 
Table 9: Summary Statistics of MSME Lending, 2005–2010 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 ALL 
 % of loans to micro and small: Whole sample 
Mean 15.8 16.07 17.31 16.51 15.79 17.49 16.64 
Std Dev 14.44 15.29 16.73 14.99 14.8 15.6 25.34 
Min 0.95 0.59 1 0.77 0.55 1.12 0.55 
Max 87.99 75.57 84.56 87 88.31 88.18 88.31 
  % of loans to medium: Whole sample 
Mean 11.12 10.63 11.7 11.7 10.32 10.01 10.92 
Std Dev 11.4 11.06 12.68 11.05 9.08 9.56 10.91 
Min 0.53 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.1 0.12 0.09 
Max 61.83 59.04 63.5 62.45 54.01 62.39 63.5 
  % of loans to micro and small: UKB 
Mean 8.16 7.54 7.57 7.78 7.66 7.66 7.73 
Std Dev 3.8 3.19 3.45 3.17 2.95 3.1 3.31 
Min 5.27 5 4.75 1.79 1.97 1.74 1.74 
Max 30.05 23.83 27.34 22.63 15.73 21.54 30.05 
  % of loans to medium: UKB 
Mean 7.13 6.35 6.49 7.53 7.43 7.86 7.06 
Std Dev 5.25 4.51 4.57 4.83 4.18 5.12 4.78 
Min 1.98 2 1.64 0.15 0.1 0.12 0.1 
Max 24.93 20.98 21.85 19.39 17.18 24.53 24.93 
  % of loans to micro and small: Thrift banks 
Mean 20.78 21.31 22.61 20.52 20.71 21.81 27.3 
Std Dev 16.51 17.29 18.61 16.5 16.07 16.94 17.01 
Min 0.95 0.59 1 0.79 0.55 1.12 0.55 
Max 87.99 75.57 84.56 87 88.31 88.18 88.31 
  % of loans to medium: Thrift banks 
Mean 13.93 13.32 14.65 13.66 11.54 10.98 12.99 
Std Dev 13.54 12.96 14.7 12.52 10.24 10.86 12.58 
Min 0.53 0.22 0.09 0.2 0.31 0.26 0.09 
Max 61.83 59.04 63.5 62.45 54.01 62.39 63.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the ADB SME Financing Survey. 
24   |   References 
1 
 
 
Table 10: Frequency of Bank Direct Compliance to the Magna Carta Targets across 
Bank Types in the Philippines, 2005–2010 
  Number of Quarters the Banks Complied with the Magna Carta 
Whole Sample 0 (1–4) (5–8) (9–12) (13–16) (17–20) (21–24) 
Loans to micro and small 
enterprises       
  UNDERCOMPLY 65.4 20.1 6.9 5.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 51.6 22.1 9.7 11.8 3.5 1.3 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 39.1 22.2 15.2 13.2 8.3 1.4 0.6 
  SUPERCOMPLY 48.8 15.9 5.5 10.4 5.5 5.5 8.4 
Medium enterprises        
  UNDERCOMPLY 84.8 11.8 2.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 75.1 17.3 3.5 2.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 55.7 19.4 14.5 5.5 3.5 1.4 0.0 
  SUPERCOMPLY 30.8 10.4 4.8 10.4 9.7 8.3 25.6 
UKBs               
Loans to micro and small 
enterprises       
  UNDERCOMPLY 49.2 26.5 6.6 13.3 4.4 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 18.2 17.7 22.1 26.5 11.1 4.4 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 27.1 26.5 11.1 19.9 13.3 0.0 2.2 
  SUPERCOMPLY 75.7 19.9 0.0 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Medium enterprises        
  UNDERCOMPLY 86.7 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 64.6 19.9 6.6 6.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 49.2 15.5 17.7 8.8 8.8 0.0 0.0 
  SUPERCOMPLY 29.3 15.5 6.6 2.2 6.6 6.6 33.2 
Thrift banks               
Loans to micro and small 
enterprises       
  UNDERCOMPLY 72.8 17.1 7.1 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 66.8 24.2 4.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 44.6 20.2 17.1 10.1 6.0 2.0 0.0 
  SUPERCOMPLY 36.5 14.1 8.1 14.1 7.1 8.1 12.1 
Medium enterprises        
  UNDERCOMPLY 83.9 11.1 3.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
  JUSTCOMPLY 79.9 16.1 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
  OVERCOMPLY 58.7 21.2 13.1 4.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 
  SUPERCOMPLY 31.5 8.1 4.0 14.1 11.1 9.1 22.2 
UKB = universal and commercial bank. 
UNDERCOMPLY (lending < mandated), JUSTCOMPLY (mandated=lending ൏  1.1*mandated), OVERCOMPLY 
(1.1*mandated൑lending൏ 2*mandated), and SUPERCOMPLY (lending൒2*mandated) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the ADB SME Financing Survey. 
  
References   |   25 
 
Figure 1: Bank Lending to MSMEs 
 
                                                              a. Level                                                                                  b. Year-on-year 
change, by type of bank 
 MSME = micro, small, and medium  enterprise; RCB = rural and cooperative bank; THB = thrift bank; UKB = universal and 
commercial bank. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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Figure 2: Bank Lending to MSMEs, by Type of Bank  
(% of loan portfolio) 
 
 
ME = medium enterprise; MSE = micro and small enterprise; MSME = micro, small, and medium enterprise; RCB = rural and 
cooperative bank; THB = thrift bank; UKB = universal and commercial bank. 
Note: Total loan portfolio is net of certain exclusions per BSP Circular 625 (2008). 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Direct and Indirect Lending to MSMEs, by Type of Bank 
(% of total compliance) 
 
 
ME = medium enterprise; MSE = micro and small enterprise; MSME = micro, small, and medium enterprise; RCB = rural 
and cooperative bank; THB = thrift bank; UKB = universal and commercial bank. 
Note: Indirect compliance includes “Funds Set Aside for MSMEs” for the years 1999–2007. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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Figure 4: Share of UKBs Not Directly Complying with the Magna Carta 
UKB = universal and commercial bank. 
Note: Lending to small enterprises mandated by law was increased from 6% to 8% of total portfolio starting in 2008. 
Source: Author's calculation using BSP data (published statements of conditions). 
 
 
Figure 5: Share of THBs Not Directly Complying with the Magna Carta 
 
THB = thrift bank. 
Note: Lending to small enterprises mandated by law was increased from 6% to 8% of total portfolio starting Q4 2008. 
Source: Author's calculation using BSP data (published statements of conditions). 
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